HC-128 is an eSTREAM final portfolio stream cipher. Several authors have investigated its security and, in particular, distinguishing attacks have been considered. Still, no one has been able to provide a distinguisher stronger than the one presented by Wu in the original HC-128 paper. In this paper we first argue that the keystream requirement in Wu's original attack is underestimated by a factor of almost 2 8 . Our revised analysis shows that the keystream complexity of Wu's original attack is 2 160.471 32-bit keystream blocks. We then go on to investigate two new types of distinguishers on HC-128. One of them, a distinguisher counting the number of zeros in created blocks of bits, gives a biased distribution that requires 2 143.537 such constructed block samples (2 152.537 32-bit keystream blocks). For fairness, the same metric is used to compare our attack to Wu's, and our improvement is significant compared to Wu's original result. Furthermore, the vector-based methodology used is general and can be applied to any cryptographic primitive that reveals a suitable probability distribution.
Introduction
HC-128 [13] is a stream cipher selected for the eSTREAM [5] final portfolio [4] . Being in the Profile 1 category it is suitable for fast encryption in software. In fact, in most reported results HC-128 is the fastest stream cipher in the eSTREAM final portfolio. As one example, on a Pentium M processor, the speed of HC-128 reaches 3.05 cycles/byte [13] . This makes HC-128 a very interesting target for cryptanalysis.
HC-128 was proposed in 2006 and there have been very few cryptanalytic results on the cipher. In the design paper [13] , Wu constructed a distinguisher based on the least significant bit of the 32-bit keystream words. According to our revised analysis, 2 160.471 keystream words are required to distinguish the output of the cipher from a random sequence.
The final publication is available at springerlink.com Subsequent results should be compared to this figure. To the best of our knowledge there is still no distinguisher presenting better performance than the one originally proposed by Wu. Maitra et al. [9] showed that the "least significant bit"-based distinguisher constructed by Wu can be generalized to work for any one bit of the complete 32-bit word. However, the bias of the other bits is smaller than that of the least significant bit. Thus, they present several new distinguishers, all of which are weaker than Wu's distinguisher.
Dunkelman [3] observed that keystream bits would leak information of the secret state. However, this observation has not yet been exploited in designing a distinguisher, and it was argued by Wu [12] that it cannot be used for cryptanalysis at all. The initialization step was analyzed by Liu and Qui in [8] . They showed that the key can be recovered if the internal state of the cipher is known. In [10] , Paul et al. showed that it was possible to construct one state array with knowledge of the other array and 2048 keystream words. The time complexity for this reconstruction is 2 42 . While not saying much about the security of HC-128, those results give more insight into the algorithm itself, possibly providing a foundation for future attacks.
Differential fault analysis of HC-128 was performed in [7] . It was shown that by injecting faults into the state, without control over the location or value of the fault, it is possible to recover the internal state.
Contributions of This Paper
In this paper, we consider distinguishers for the HC-128 keystream. First we argue that the result given by Wu is not correct. The amount of keystream needed is almost a factor of 2 8 higher than originally claimed. Then we give two new distinguishing attacks, both improving the attack given by Wu. First we generalize Wu's original distinguisher, which only considered the least significant bit of the keystream words, to consider several bits simultaneously. This gives a very slight improvement, about a factor of 2. A more significant improvement is achieved by looking at long vectors of the least significant bit of the keystream words. It is shown that this attack succeeds with high probability if 2 152.537 keystream words are known.
While the attack complexities of the distinguishing attacks in this paper exceeds that of an exhaustive key search, we still believe that this paper presents a significant contribution. As HC-128 is in the final eS-TREAM portfolio, additional understanding of the security of this stream cipher is important. It is clear that considering words instead of a single bit in Wu's original distinguisher does not worsen the attack, but the exact improvement has previously been an open question. This question is resolved in our paper. Moreover, by treating the information from the keystream differently, we are able to significantly improve the keystream complexity of the attack. Our new attack is the first attack requiring less keystream than Wu's original attack, presented in 2006. It is possible that these new ideas can lead to even better attacks, perhaps reducing the keystream complexity to a number below 2 128 .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe distinguishing attacks and hypothesis testing. This provides the necessary tools to determine the complexity of our attack. In Section 3 we give an overview of HC-128 and then, in Section 4, we present Wu's original distinguishing attack and argue that the keystream complexity is underestimated by a factor of almost 2 8 due to dependencies. Then in Section 5 we give our first new distinguisher based on the idea of considering words instead of bits as was done in the original attack. This distinguisher generalize the efforts of Maitra et al. [9] , showing that it is possible to construct a (slightly) more efficient distinguisher in this way. In Section 6 we give our second distinguisher based on the idea of considering a large vector of the least significant bit, thereby extracting more information from the keystream. The paper is concluded in Section 7.
Preliminaries
In this paper we will consider distinguishing attacks on the keystream generator HC-128. A distinguisher in this case is an algorithm that takes a sequence of n samples as input and outputs either "HC-128" or "RAN-DOM". The algorithm uses the n input samples to perform a hypothesis test. Knowing the two distributions corresponding to HC-128 and random, the algorithm determines which distribution is most likely, given the n samples. The optimal hypothesis test is given by the Neyman-Pearson lemma.
Lemma 1 (Neyman-Pearson). Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n be drawn iid (independent identically distributed) according to mass function P X . Consider the decision problem corresponding to the hypotheses P X = P 0 vs.
Let α = P n 0 [A c n (T )], where c denotes complement, and β = P n 1 [A n (T )] be the error probabilities corresponding to the decision region A n . Let B n be any other decision region with associated error probabilities α * and β * . If α * ≤ α, then β * ≥ β.
Assuming that all samples are independent, (1) is equivalent to
The most important measurement of the power of a distinguisher in this setting is the number of samples that is required for it to make a correct decision with probability significantly larger than 1/2. We start by defining the relative entropy between two distributions. Definition 1. The relative entropy between two probability distributions P 0 and P 1 over the same domain X is defined as
The relative entropy is sometimes also referred to as information divergence or Kullback-Leibler distance.
In a hypothesis test we observe a collection of independent and identically distributed samples drawn from a distribution P X . This will give us two possible hypotheses, the null hypothesis H 0 and the alternate hypothesis H 1 :
There are two types of errors associated with our hypotheses. We can reject the null hypothesis when it is in fact true, a type I error. The probability of this error is denoted α. The other alternative is that we accept the null hypothesis when the alternate hypothesis is true, a type II error. The probability of this error is denoted β.
No general expression for the error probabilities α and β exists. Thus, we know how to perform the optimal test using the Neyman-Pearson lemma, but we do not know the performance of the test (in the general case). However, there exist asymptotic expressions for the error probabilities.
The relative entropy is related to the asymptotic error probabilities through Stein's lemma. Stein's lemma states that if we fix the error probability α then β decreases so that lim n→∞ log β n = −D(P 0 P 1 ).
The value of α does not affect the exponential rate at which β decreases. According to (3) we can asymptotically write
When the number of samples used in the hypothesis test approaches
we reach the point at which the error probability starts to decrease exponentially. In this paper we will use (5) as a measure of the number of samples that are needed in our distinguishing attack. However, we emphasize that in a practical scenario we would actually need a small multiple of this number. Still, as we are comparing our attack to previous attacks, if we use (5) for all attacks, the comparison is indeed fair. Other ways of estimating the number of samples needed in the distinguisher exist, and we refer to [1, 2, 6] for a more detailed treatment.
Brief Description of HC-128
In this section we give a brief description of HC-128. The size of the key K is 128 bits and the initialization vector IV used is also 128 bits. According to the proposal, a keystream of length up to 2 64 bits per key/IV pair can be generated.
Notations
We use the same notations as in [13] . Let x and y be 32-bit integers. Then, + : x + y means x + y mod 2 32 , : x y means x − y mod 512, ⊕ : bit-wise exclusive OR, || : concatenation, : Right shift, x n means x right shifted by n bits, : Left shift, x n means x left shifted by n bits, ≫ : Right shift with rotation, x ≫ n means
Two tables, denoted P and Q, make up the internal state of HC-128. Each of the tables contain 512 32-bit elements, or words. The keystream is denoted by s and the 32-bit keystream word generated at the i th step is denoted s i . Thus s = s 0 ||s 1 ||s 2 || . . .. The following six functions are used in HC-128.
x is a 32-bit word and the x i represent a byte each, x 0 being the least significant byte of the word and x 3 being the most significant byte. The functions f 1 (x) and f 2 (x) are only used in the initialization of the cipher. As our analysis is independent of the initialization it will not be detailed here. Instead we refer to [13] for a description.
The Keystream Generation Algorithm
The keystream generation algorithm is the subject of our analysis. At each step, one element of a table is updated and one 32-bit keystream word is generated. One table is used to generate 512 consecutive keystream words. That table is then updated during the following 512 steps. The keystream generation algorithm of HC-128 is given in Fig. 1 .
Original Distinguishing Attack by Wu
In the HC-128 design paper, a distinguishing attack was given based on the least significant bit of the keystream word s i . At the i th step, if (i mod 1024) < 512, the table P is updated as
Also, s i = h 1 (P [i 12]) ⊕ P [i mod 512]. For 10 ≤ (i mod 1024) < 511, this feedback function can be written alternatively as
Algorithm 1 -HC-128 Keystream Generation Input: initialized tables P and Q, each containing 512 32-bit words.
Output: 32-bit keystream words si for i = 0, 1, . . ..
h 1 (x) and h 1 (x) indicate two different functions because they refer to different S-boxes; z j denotes the P [j 12] at the j th step.
As shown in [13] , for the least significant bit, this equation reduces to
where [a] i represents the i th least significant bit of a. Looking at two different time instances i and j where 1024×γ +10 ≤ i, j < 1024×γ +511 we can write
which holds if and only if
We call these expressions t i and t j , respectively, so that
Equation (8) can be approximated as
where H denotes a random secret 80-to-1-bit S-box, a 1 and a 2 are two 80-bit random inputs,
where z indicates the concatenation of the least significant byte and the second most significant byte of z, i.e., z = x 0 ||x 2 . The following theorem, from [13] , shows the bias of (9).
Let H be an m-to-n-bit S-box and all those n-bit elements are randomly generated, where m ≥ n. Let a 1 and a 2 be two m-bit random inputs to H. Then H(
Thus, (9) holds with probability 1 2 + ε = 1 2 + 2 −81 . Approximating the number of samples needed in a distinguisher by 4ε −2 , Wu concludes that 2 164 such equations are needed. Since it is possible to obtain 501 2 ≈ 2 17 pairs for each 512-word keystream chunk, the number of keystream words needed are concluded to be 2 156 , a factor of ( 501 2 ) 501 ≈ 2 8 less. This is however not correct. Let us explain why. The distinguisher considers two different cases, one when the output is from the cipher (HC-128) and the other one when the output is truly random and bits are independent. When we consider the random case, a block contains 512 truly random bits. These give rise to 501 truly random values t i , where 10 ≤ i < 511. But when we then create 2 17 samples as t i ⊕ t j , 10 ≤ i, j < 511, these are no longer independent, and counting these samples will have a larger variance compared to independent samples. So in order to keep the samples independent, we can only use 501 samples and the number of required keystream words is thus still 2 164 in Wu's attack.
Wu claims that the keystream complexity of his distinguisher can be lowered by a factor of almost 2 8 using his dependent sampling technique. Our simulations 3 suggest otherwise. They clearly show that this kind of dependent sampling can be much less efficient. The consequence of this is that more samples need to be used with Wu's sampling method. In this sense, the dependent samples are not "high quality", they contain less information than the independent ones.
When it comes to assessing the efficiency level of Wu's dependent sampling, this is not a trivial task. It is unclear how much the keystream complexity can be lowered using this technique. Wu himself provides neither analytical nor simulation results to back his assumption of perfect efficiency. His analysis remains correct for the standard setting of linear sampling, however, so this is what we will assume henceforth.
This being said, our simulations do show that some improvement gain in keystream requirement can result from using dependent sampling. Our simulations further suggest that the vector approach detailed in Section 6 improves the result of Wu's distinguisher in this regard as well. Sampling all 501 3 triplets for the 3-vector distinguisher is more keystream-efficient than sampling all 501 2 pairs for the 2-vector case. The approach is trivially generalized into sampling all 501 250 250-sets for the 250-vector distinguisher.
To conclude, we continue the analysis and comparison of our attacks to Wu's using only independent samples for both attacks. As we are using the relative entropy measure in this paper, we give the corresponding figure using this metric also for Wu's attack. This allows us to make a fair comparison between our results and Wu's attack. With p = 1 2 + 2 −81 we get D(P 0 ||P 1 ) = 2 −160.471 giving a distinguisher requiring 2 160.471 samples. According to the arguments given above this also corresponds to 2 160.471 keystream words. For comparison, our best distinguisher (in Section 6) will be shown to have both a computational and keystream complexity of 2 152.537 .
A New Word-Based Distinguisher
Wu's distinguisher considered the least significant bit of each keystream word. We now construct a word-based distinguisher, in which we consider the w least significant bits together. Since the least significant bit is included in the w least significant bits, we know that the attack can never get worse by including more bits. The main question that we aim to answer here is exactly how much better the word-based distinguisher is.
We use [s i ] <w> to denote the w least significant bits of [s i ] and [s i ] <w+b> to denote bits b, b+1, . . . , b+w−1 of [s i ]. For the least significant w bits 0, 1, 2, . . . , w − 1, equation (6) can be written as
We write this as [t i ] <w> = H w (a i ) + carry. The carry contribution comes from the approximation of '+' by ⊕, and this part will be discussed in Section 5.1 below. The main goal is to find the distribution of [t i ] <w> ⊕ [t j ] <w> , where i and j are chosen as in (7) . Once this is known we can use the relative entropy to determine the number of samples needed in the distinguisher.
Approximate H w (a i ) as a 80-to-w-bit S-box and use Theorem 1 to show that
To show how to compute the distribution of [t i ] <w> ⊕ [t j ] <w> we consider two cases separately, namely when the least significant bit of l is 0 and 1 respectively. We let T (w,i,j) and H (w,i,j) denote [t i ] <w> ⊕ [t j ] <w> and H w (a i ) ⊕ H w (a j ), respectively.
Case 1:
The least significant bit (LSB) of l is 1.
In this case we can write
The last equation follows from Pr(T (w,i,j) = l|H (w,i,j) = 0) = 0. We see that the probability is always the same when the LSB of l is 1.
Case 2:
The LSB of l is 0.
Finding Pr(T (w,i,j) = l) in this case reduces to finding p l .
The Effect of Carry Bits in the Linear Approximation
We now analyze the influence of the carry introduced in (10). When only the least significant bit is considered there is no influence of any carry. In our case, this analysis is needed in order to compute p l when w > 1. First we note that there are two '+' in (6) that are approximated by ⊕. Linear approximations of modulo 2 w additions of k integers was studied by Staffelbach and Meier [11] . Maitra et al. [9] extended this idea to approximate the feedback functions g 1 and g 2 by replacing the two '+' with ⊕ operators. However they considered the effect of the approximation on only one bit. We extend this idea to words of several bits.
Let X, Y, Z be three w-bit integers and let A = (X + Y + Z) mod 2 w and B = X ⊕ Y ⊕ Z. We consider the carries that are produced in each bit position of A ⊕ B. Let C = A ⊕ B, so that C i represents the carry generated at the i th least significant bit due to the linear approximation. The least significant bit of A will always be equal to the least significant bit of B, because there are no carries that affect this bit position. We consider the carries from the w least significant bits and give a recursive formula for the distribution of the w least significant carry bits. and Pr(A ⊕ B = 11) = p 3 2 = 0. Now, suppose we know the distribution of A ⊕ B for the k least significant bits, then we can find the distribution of A ⊕ B for the k + 1 least significant bits. Note that Pr(A ⊕ B = s k 0s k−2 s k−3 · · · s 0 ) = 1 2 Pr(A⊕B = 0s k−2 s k−3 · · · s 0 ), since the carry value at position (k − 1) does not affect the carry value at position k. Hence,
If the carry bit at position k −1 is 1, then the Table 1 lists the possible carry bit values at position k. We see that p i k+1 = 1 4 p i k Table 1 . The values of carry bits at position k.
We can now give a recursive formula for generating carries and thus for approximating the '+' by ⊕ operators. Starting out with the basic case Pr(A ⊕ B = 00) = p 0 2 = 1 2 , Pr(A ⊕ B = 01) = p 1 2 = 0, Pr(A ⊕ B = 10) = p 2 2 = 1 2 , Pr(A ⊕ B = 11) = p 3 2 = 0, the carry generated for the least k + 1 significant bits is given by
As an example, for word size w = 3 we have Pr(A ⊕ B = 000) = Utilizing this recursive expression we have computed the distribution of [t i ] <w> ⊕ [t j ] <w> for 1 ≤ w ≤ 18. The inverse of the relative entropy between the cipher distribution and the uniform distribution is given in Table 2 . This corresponds to the number of samples needed in the distinguisher. Note that the original attack by Wu corresponds to word size 1. It is clear that the attack is improved, though the gain is small. Still, this settles the open problem of determining the advantage of considering a word-based distinguisher for HC-128. We can note that when the least significant two bits are considered then the required number of samples is same as that for w = 1. This is consistent with the result of Maitra et al. [9] who stated that the second least significant bit does not affect the bias in any way.
When implementing the word-based distinguisher in practice, one may use 2 w counters. From all keystream words, compute the w-bit result according to (10) and increase the corresponding counter. When finished counting, perform the hypothesis test on the resulting distribution (the counter values) to see if the HC-128 or the ideal probability distribution yields the closest fit.
A New Vector-Based Distinguisher
In [13] Wu found a bias in t i ,
by considering pairs (t i , t j ), i = j, and xoring them to form t i ⊕ t j . We now extend this idea to binary vectors of length n with 2 ≤ n ≤ 501. Take n consecutive t i 's and form the vector (t i , t i+1 , . . . , t i+n−1 ) . Consider the weight w = n−1 k=0 t i+k of such vectors. We will study weight probability distributions W to show that HC-128 behavior is less than ideal. That is, we want to find P (W = w) for all values of 0 ≤ w ≤ n, both for the cipher and the ideal case. Once this is done, we can assert the efficiency of our distinguisher by comparing the two distributions.
We will first go through the conceptual structure of our problem and state the ideal weight probability distribution in Section 6.1. We will then show how to calculate the cipher's weight probability distribution for a simplified case in Section 6.2. We then construct the full weight probability distribution for the cipher by learning how to combine different weight probability distributions. This is covered in Section 6.3, where we also derive the resulting distinguisher performance.
The Ideal Vector Weight Probability Distribution
Each bit t i in the vector is derived from several lookups into the same table Q (or P ). Recall the expression
Table Q (or P ) contains 512 32-bit words, and lookup into Q (P ) is divided into the upper and lower half according to function h 1 (h 2 ). Note that h 1 and h 1 denote lookup into different tables, and note also that we only use one bit from each 32-bit lookup value for t i so that the table bit positions differ for each application of h 1 . Thus, t i is essentially derived by xoring lookups from ten different lookup tables of size 256 (with binary entries). One may view t i as the result of xoring the output of ten different (non-invertible) 8-to-1-bit S-boxes. The conceptual composition of t i is illustrated in Fig. 2 . HC-128 reuses the same tables with fixed values during several consecutive time instances, so t i and t j with i = j are pairwise dependent for this period of time. But we first consider the ideal case, in which fresh 8-to-1-bit tables are used for every time instance, so that t i and t j with i = j are independent.
Let W ideal denote a stochastic variable that returns the weight of a vector produced according to the above stated conditions. Every vector is equally likely in the ideal case, so the resulting vector weight probability distribution is combinatorially determined by Pr(W ideal = w) = n w 2 −n .
The Cipher's Vector Weight Probability Distribution
Calculating the weight probability distribution of the cipher is much more complicated. We now reuse the same tables, so t i and t j with i = j are pairwise dependent. We begin by simplifying this case by assuming that only one 8-to-1-bit table is used to produce each vector bit t i . At first glance, deriving this probability distribution for vector lengths n approaching 500 is no walk in the park. We will first show how this distribution can be recursively determined for the simplified case with one table. We hope that this algorithm will clearly illustrate how the probabilities are derived. The recursiveness is an impediment as n approaches 500, of course, so we also show how to compute the same distribution more efficiently using dynamic programming.
With the recursive approach, one would hope that full knowledge of the weight distribution for vectors of length k would be easily deduced from the distribution for vectors of length k − 1. This is, however, not the case. A vector of length k and weight w can be derived from a vector of length k − 1 with a) weight w if i) a zero is read from a previously opened We use the variables a 0 and a 1 to keep track of the number of opened table entries of each sort. The recursive algorithm is given in Fig. 3 in pseudocode resembling C.
bytes of memory, where L denotes the size of the number type that is being used for storing the probabilities 4 . The computational complexity 5 is bounded by 257 2 2 n k=0 (k + 1) = 257 2 (n + 1)(n + 2) 4
instructions involving multiple precision multiplications. This algorithm dominates the experiment, both in terms of memory requirements and computational complexity. Reaching the HC-128 limit for n = 501 is feasible with a reasonable computer and a healthy measure of patience. Now that we can obtain the weight probability distribution of the cipher for a single S-box (table), we need to learn how to derive the corresponding distribution for the xor of all ten S-boxes.
Xoring Weight Probability Distributions
Our simplification so far is that we assume only one S-box. How do we find the corresponding weight probability distribution when we are xoring the output of two S-boxes? Algorithm XorDistributions in Fig. 5 shows how to combine two distributions. Given two different S-boxes, potentially with different weight probability distributions, we still know precisely what to expect from their xored output in terms of vector weight.
The algorithm works as follows. Consider vectors v 1 and v 2 with weights i and j, respectively. If k ones are overlapping, the xored vector v 1 ⊕ v 2 will contain i + j − 2k ones. The algorithm sums the probabilities over all possible tuple values (i, j, k). The binomial expression
in the algorithm states the probability of a k-bit overlap given two vectors of weight i and j.
Using this algorithm we can easily and successively deduce the probability distributions for the resulting vector weight over, in turn, 2, 4, 8 and 10 tables.
Last but not least, we need to compare the ideal and the biased probability distributions. We do this by using the divergence measure according to (2) . For various vector lengths n and number of S-boxes, the required 4 64-bit data types do not provide sufficient precision to measure differences in probability distributions when considering the full 10-table case. , respectively. These formulas do leave some room for improvement.
Algorithm 4 -XorDistributions
Input: vector length n, probability distributions p and q (n + 1 values each). Output: probability distribution r. r = (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0); /* length n + 1 */ for (i = 0; i < n + 1; i++) { for (j = 0; j < n + 1; j++) { for (k = max(0, i + j − n); k < min(i, j)
; } } } return r; number of samples for our distinguisher are presented in Table 3 . Note the reappearance of the value 2 160.471 for n = 2 over 10 S-boxes that was derived in Section 5 and also corresponds to Wu's attack. As a verification, the case n = 10 over one S-box was also simulated to ensure correctness. The simulation results matched the theoretical findings. Using this analysis, the actual distinguishing attack on HC-128 would proceed as follows. Instantiate n + 1 counters, one for each possible vector weight. From all keystream words, compute the n-bit vector samples by repeatedly applying (11) . Based on the resulting vector weight, increase the corresponding counter. When finished counting, perform the hypoth-esis test on the resulting distribution (the counter values) to see if the HC-128 or the ideal probability distribution yields the closest fit.
Our best result for the full HC-128 with 10 S-boxes is a requirement of 2 143.537 samples for n = 501. Each sample is derived from the least significant bits of n keystream words, so the total complexity is no more than 2 152.537 keystream words.
The reader may further note that the time units used here correspond to very simple operations involving only xor and shifts of keystream words. These operations are much cheaper than the initializations considered in a brute-force search. One key initialization takes about 27300 clock cycles [13] , involving both a key expansion and 1024 table updates. For comparison, one single key initialization corresponds to processing about 2 10 keystream words using our simple operations.
Conclusion
We have presented two new distinguishing attacks on the eSTREAM portfolio stream cipher HC-128. Both techniques use the underlying idea of using more information from the keystream than obtained from a simple xor of the least significant bit. The first idea is based on looking at several bits in the keystream words simultaneously. This gives a slight improvement over the original attack. The second technique puts bits in a long vector and considers the distribution of the weight of this vector. Using non-trivial techniques we are able to compute the distribution of the vector weight and we show that the corresponding distinguishing attack requires 2 152.537 keystream words. This is the most efficient distinguishing result known for HC-128. It exploits more information than any other distinguisher, and it is an open problem if it is possible to improve this result even further.
